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Abstract
A range of legal regimesfrom employment law to corporate and securities law foresees a reduction or elimination of "enterprise liability"for organizationsthat can demonstrate the existence of
"effective" internal compliance structures. The pervasiveness of corporate conduct codes and internal compliance programs, while reflecting the importance ascribed to these codes and programs by
different juridictions,also raises questions regarding the extent to which companies are willing to
take measures to encourage compliance with the law andnip corporatemisconduct in the bud before
courts and agencies detect such errant behavior. With a compliance industry that has developed
over the past decade at an insurmountablepace, the previously defined borders of criminal law,
employment law, and antitrust law are hazier and their relationship more intertwined. This
article aims to lay out the interaction between these fields of law by particularlyexamining whistleblowing and elements of setting up effective compliance programs.
A range of legal regimes, from environmental law to tort law, from employment law to
corporate and securities law, foresees a reduction or elimination of "enterprise liability"
for organizations that can demonstrate the existence of "effective" internal compliance
* An extended version of this article was originally presented as a scientific report on the theme discussed
during the joint session of the Competition Law, Labor Law, and Criminal Law Commissions at the 56th
Union Internationale des Avocats Congress, in Dresden, Germany, on October 31-November 3, 2012. This
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structures. With competent and committed management teams, internal compliance
structures "may play a central role in the organization's preventive approach to organizational misconduct, depending on the size and structure of the specific organization."i The
pervasiveness of corporate conduct codes and internal compliance programs (collectively,
internal compliance structures) reflect the importance ascribed to these codes and programs by different jurisdictions, while raising questions regarding the extent companies
are willing to take measures to encourage compliance with the law before courts and agencies detect such errant behavior.
With a compliance industry that has developed over the past decade at an insurmountable pace, the previously defined borders of criminal law, employment law, and antitrust
law are hazier and the relationships more intertwined. Internal corporate compliance
structures are dispersed across a multitude of jurisdictions and regulated under various
laws, either in the local criminal legislation, local labor laws, antitrust/competition laws, or
even separate bodies of corporate governance laws. Corporate compliance questions
raised across three fields of law-criminal law, employment law, and antitrust law-may
challenge parties from both sides of the dais; enterprises may be placed in the good or bad
category depending on whether they have an effective compliance program, designed to
ostensibly detect violations. Courts and agencies, on the other hand, must embrace the
task of interpreting whether criminal liability hinges on the effectiveness of a compliance
program or whether companies will be required to meet prescriptive standards rather than
specific industry needs. The latter need arises from courts and agencies having limited
expertise, time, budget, and imperfect guidance on what will serve as compliance with
law. 2
Bearing in mind existing incentives to implement internal compliance structures, this
article examines compliance programs and the interaction between criminal law, employment law, and antitrust law in resolving corporate compliance questions by examining
whistleblowing and elements of setting up effective compliance programs. Section I follows a segmented approach to whistleblowing, which forms a central topic of this article
for its vital role in detecting and preventing corporate misconduct. Canvassing international law and domestic law perspectives, this section discusses implications of divergence
between the United States and European Union for assessing whistleblowing practices.
Section II concludes by outlining the elements of an effective compliance program and the
different standards established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines (USSG)3 for interpreting
the effectiveness attribute.

1. Kimberly D. Krawiec, OrganizationalMisconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FiA. ST. U. L.
REV. 571, 614 (2005) [hereinafter Krawiec, OrganizationalMisconduct].
2. Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal RationalMyths: The New Institutionalismand the Law and
Society Tradition, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUiRY 903, 934 (1996).
3. U.S. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A § 3E1. (2001)
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Wlhistleblowing4

The existence of a whistleblowing policy within an organization can influence an employee's legal status in several ways. First, the inevitable question concerning the extent
employees have a duty to follow the compliance program arises: do they have an actual
legal duty to blow the whistle in the prescribed cases? Furthermore, questions arise regarding the legality of data storage during investigation. As external companies are often
involved in compliance (especially whistleblowing) policies, issues may emerge following
the transfer of data relating to misconduct (and personal data of whistleblowers). Protecting an employee's rights is a relevant concern after an employee has blown the whistle. As
whistleblowers experience retaliation, more often than not, the protection of employees
against such negative consequences is considered crucial for effective compliance
programs.
This section mainly addresses the legal consequences of whistleblowing policies, starting with a brief introduction to this topic. The facilitation of internal whistleblowing is
increasingly recognized as a valuable policy in both the public and private sector, and
several guidelines created by international and national organizations serve as models for
5
the construction of whistleblowing policy.
Whistleblowing is generally regarded as a form of corporate dissent.6 An area of controversy amongst scholars over the definition of this concept is whether the definition of
whistleblowing should be limited to external (i.e. public) whistleblowing (i.e. directly
alarming the media without flagging the matter internally within the company).7 For the
purpose of this article, in indicating reasons for employees (not) to act further to observed
misconducts, the definition will not be limited to external (i.e. public) whistleblowing.
To create an internal framework, an organization's management decides on significant
areas of consideration including the following: who can blow the whistle (can ex-employees benefit from this policy?); issues and misconducts covered by whistleblowing; who
would be the addressee to receive such concerns; how these concerns would be raised (by
using "hotlines"?8); whether to facilitate confidential and anonymous reporting; whether
to address the means of protection of whistleblowers; what system to use for recording
and tracking complaints; whether whistleblowing is an employee right or a duty; dealing
with malicious reporting; how whistleblowers are rewarded; what would the method of
providing advice to whistleblowers be; determining and outlining the roles and responsi4. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009) (defining whistleblower as "{ain employee who reports
employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement agency.").
5. See, e.g., ICC COMMISSION ON ANTI-CORRUPTION, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC GUIDELINES ON WHISTLEBLOWING (2008), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/docu
ment-centre/2008/icc-guidelines-on-whisleblowing/
(last visited July 10, 2013) [hereinafter ICC GUIDELINES ON WHISTLEBLOWING]; see also BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTE, WHISTLEBLOWING ARRANGEMENTS CODE OF PRACTICE (2008).
6. Frederick A. Elliston, Civil Disobedience and Whbistleblowing: A Comparative Appraisal of Two Forms of
Dissent, 1 J. Bus. ETHIcs 23, 23-28 (1982).
7. JOSEPH J. MARTOCCHIO, RESEARCH IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 100
(Emerald Group Pub., 2005).

8. MOLLIE PAINTER-MORLAND & RENP TEN
204 (Cambridge Univ. Press Pub., 2011).
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bilities of individuals during investigation; and operating, monitoring, and reviewing the
whistleblowing policy, as well as training employees to effectively handle complaints.9
A.

WHISTLEBLOWING COMPONENT TO CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

One of the most important elements of a corporate compliance program is a policy
encouraging transparency and honesty through the disclosure of anticompetitive activities.
The whistleblowing component of a corporate compliance program is essential to promote appropriate corporate actions at different levels in the corporate structure. Establishing effective whistleblowing programs is subject to varying definitions, requirements,
protections, and enforcement.
Whistleblowing, as a means of reporting, inter alia, corruption, fraudulent behavior,
and/or misconduct, is challenging to define and, therefore, there is "no generally accepted
definition."' 0 It is difficult to provide a broad and accurate definition of corruption because it cuts across moral values and social or cultural norms; therefore, international
conventions tend to provide specific actions that are deemed as constituting corruption by
signatories." This, in turn, affects the contours within which whistleblowing is understood and contextualized.
Whistleblowing intends to promote transparency in corporations through advancing
the truth and encouraging individuals to report violations. Regardless of the noble intention behind whistleblowing, there remain barriers to effective whistleblowing.12 Some of
these barriers include employees lacking awareness of whistleblowing mechanisms, lacking
trust in the company to combat corruption, feeling guilty for the effect of disclosures on
employees and shareholders, fearing retaliatory effects from disclosure, and cultural constraints that indicate a negative perception of whistleblowers.13
An effective whistleblowing mechanism provides legal remedies for retaliatory actions,
rewards whistleblowers, and provides processes that encourage disclosure of suspected illegal actions.14 These protective mechanisms could include protection from job termination or transfer, preference to requests for work transfer, confidentiality, legal immunity
(including protection from defamation lawsuits), penalties to those who retaliate against
the whistleblower (such as imprisonment or disciplinary action), and police protection for
a whistleblower and his/her family.' 5
9. Dave Lewis & Wim Vandekerckhove, The Content of Whistleblowing Procedures:A CriticalReview ofRecent Official Guidelines, 108 J. Bus. ETHics 253, 253-56 (2012) [hereinafter Lewis & Vandekerckhove].
10. What is WB?, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE REGION,
http://www.whistleblowing-cee.org/about-whistleblowing/ (last visited July 10, 2013).
11. Indira Carr & David Lewis, Combating CorruptionThrough Employment Law and Whistleblower Protection,
39 INDus. L. J. 52, 56 (2010) [hereinafter Carr & Lewis 2010].
12. Barriers to effective whistleblowing include fear of retaliation, legal liability, and cultural barriers. See
generally DAVID BANISAR, Whistleblowing: International Standards and Developments, in CORRUPTION AND
TRANSPARENCY: DEBATING THE FRONTIERs BETWEEN STATE, MARKET AND SocIETY 5 (Irma Sandoval
ed., 2011), available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1753180 (last visited July 10, 2013).
13. Annie Enriquez-Geron, Public Services Independent Confederation (PSLINK) General Secretary,
Vice President-Public Services International, Blowing the Whistle: A Window for Civil Society Engagement
and Holding the Government Accountable in Fighting Corruption, available at http://unpanl.un.org/intra
doc/groups/public/documents/un/unpanO27828.pdf (last visited July 10, 2013).
14. Id.
15. Id.

VOL. 47, NO. 1

HARMONIZING SHIELD TO CORPORATE LIABILITY
B.

103

INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES

This section addresses the rise of international and regional agreements on corporate
governance; it specifically addresses compliance programs and whistleblowing practices,
which are simultaneously based on and influencing domestic whistleblowing laws. It provides a summary of relevant agreements and their impact on domestic criminal and employment law.
The increase of international business transactions and corporate interactions recognize
the necessity of global compliance programs. Most national laws on corruption, however,
are inadequate to deal with cross-border corruption issues.16
Whistleblowing is an important component of successful corporate compliance programs recognized by international efforts to promote global support. Increasing international business transactions and corporate interactions necessitate a rise in global
compliance initiatives, which have an effect on national criminal laws, employment laws,
and antitrust laws.i 7 International standards established to promote competition require
integration with international standards for compliance, indicating an overlap between
compliance and antitrust law.' 8 Additionally, most national laws on corruption are inade9
quate to deal with cross-border corruption issues.1 International anti-corruption agreements also attempt to address these cross-border corruption issues by providing an
adequate standard that all nations can support. International efforts to produce corporate
compliance frameworks include whistleblowing as an important component of successful
programs.
International agreements bridge gaps between divergent national laws to create a synthesized approach to handling corruption across multiple jurisdictions. International
agreements that address whistleblowing at a global level include the United Nations Convention on Corruption, 20 the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Pub2
lic Officials in International Business Transactions, 1 and the International Chamber of
22
are also regional agreements that inThere
on
Whistleblowing.
Commerce Guidelines
clude provisions on whistleblowers within a specific geographic area. The European
23
Council has produced both the Civil Law Convention on Corruption and the Criminal
24
Law Convention on Corruption.
16. Carr & Lewis, supra note 11, at 53.
17. Id. at 53, 79.
18. Ted Banks & Joe Murphy, The InternationalLaw of Antitrust Compliance, 40 DENV. J. INT'L. L. &
POL'Y. 368, 368 (2012).
19. Carr & Lewis, supra note 11, at 53.
20. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37 (entered into force Dec.
14, 2005).
21. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD].
22. ICC GUIDELINES ON WHISTLEBLOWING,

supra note 5.

23. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Council of Europe, openedfor signature Nov. 4, 1999, C.E.T.S.
No. 174 (entered into force Nov. 1, 2003).
24. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Council of Europe, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1999,
CE.T.S. No. 173 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
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International and regional anti-corruption conventions interact with national criminal
laws, employment laws, and antitrust laws. In Europe, national laws and regional rules
provide two levels for managing whistleblowing programs.
The international agreements on whistleblowing, however, create only a broad framework to ensure that signatory states agree to the general principles of whistleblowing
while allowing flexibility in the implementation. An international perspective on whistleblowing poses certain challenges to implementation and investigation. Individual nations,
while agreeing with the overall scheme of international agreements, continue to implement whistleblowing laws through national, social, and cultural-based legal frameworks.
The United States does not have significant data protection legislation in place. There
are several specific laws covering particular business sectors and self-regulations in other
sectors. European data protection law is significantly more comprehensive. As the E.U.
Member State countries began adopting varying data protection regulations, the crossborder information flow was restricted. 25 This encouraged the European Union to adopt
a Directive for Member States to incorporate into their national laws. 26 Directive 95/46
EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data establishes when the processing of personal data is lawful
and acceptable. 27 The main requirements for such processing are (i) transparency, (ii)
serving a legitimate purpose, and (iii) proportionality. 28
In response to developments in France, where the French data protection agency published guidelines on the lawfulness of anonymous whistleblowing policies (CNIL Guidelines), the European Article 29 Working Party (Working Party) issued an opinion on "the
application of EU data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the fields of
accounting, internal accounting controls, auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking
and financial crime." 29 Following this opinion, the main points of considerations for
whistleblowing mechanisms are: "fair and lawful processing," "legitimate purpose," "relevance," "accuracy," "retention," "security," and "data transfer." 30 While this opinion is
not legally binding and is limited in scope, it is, however, the main document expressing
collective European policy.
As indicated above, 3 ' the American and European standards on whistleblowing policies
and data protection standards are not coherent. These differences have significant conse25. Anonymous Whistleblowing Systems and CNIL and European Union Data Protection Measures, MYSAFE
WORucPLACE, 2 (2006), http://www.mysafeworkplace.com/pdf/cnil.pdf [hereinafter MYSAFEWORKPLACE
2006].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Opinion 1/2006 on the Application of the EU Data Protection Rules to Internal Whistleblowing
Schemes in the Fields of Accounting, Internal Accounting Controls, Auditing Matters, Fight Against Bribery,
Banking and Financial Crime, Art. 29 Working Party Opinion 1/2006, 00195/06 WP 117 (Feb. 1, 2006),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wpl 17_en.pdf (last visited July 10,
2013).
30. Daniel P. Cooper, Corporate Investigations & EU Data Privacy Laws-What Every In-House Counsel
Should Know, CovGrow REPORT, COVINGTON & BURLING 6-8 (2008), available at http://www.cov.com/
fSles/Publication/642283cc-5498-47ac-ad87-163246b3a569/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/la4d7e6ccl le-41al-ba25-02fe0ff77196/Corporate%20Investigations%20and%20EU%2Data%20Privacy%2Laws
%20Amended%2020%209%2008.pdf (last visited July 10, 2013).
31. See supra Section I.B.
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quences for companies involved in international business. Additionally, American companies operating in Europe face difficulties in their effort to comply with both the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX)32 and the European data protection laws. 33
1. General Wh.istleblowing Policies
International and regional anti-corruption conventions heavily influence national criminal laws, which in turn influence the development of national antitrust law and employment law. 34 International whistleblowing creates a broad framework for domestic laws to
work within, which shapes the domestic approach to corporate compliance laws, through
employment and criminal law. In Europe, there remain two levels for managing whistleblowing programs-national laws and regional rules that derive from the European Council and European Union. 35
In providing an international perspective on whistleblowing policies, certain issues can
be challenging-particularly, data protection and whistleblower protection under nationally enforced practices. Furthermore, individual nations, while agreeing with the overall
scheme of international agreements, continue to implement whistleblowing laws through
national, social, and cultural-based legal frameworks.
2. Company Implementation of Whistleblowing and Data Protection and Privacy Matters
Data protection includes important components of employment law and criminal law;
international conventions have, therefore, applied a very broad framework that allows nations to determine data protection requirements independently. 36
An example of an American law that requires publicly traded companies to incorporate
a whistleblowing mechanism is SOX, which demonstrates what international covenants do
for data protection components of whistleblower laws. 37 Section 301(4) of this Act can be
explored in detail. Notwithstanding these provisions, fears that subsequent government
or third-party access to information produced by internal compliance structures may inadvertently deter the implementation of such structures, which are better addressed through
privilege rules.38
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 and scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
33. For more on this, see generally Pulina Whitaker, MultinationalsDance to Two Whistleblowing Tunes, EUROPEAN LAWYER (2007); Paul Lanois, Sarbanes-Oxley, Whistleblowing, and European Union Data Protection Laws,
THE PRAcHCAL LAWYER 59 (Aug. 2007); see also MYSAFEWORKPLACE 2006, supra note 25, at 1.
34. Carr & Lewis 2010, supra note 11, at 78.
35. See, e.g., EuR. PARL. Ass. RESOLUTION, Protection of "Whistle-Blowers," Resolution 1729 (Apr. 29,
2010), available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?link=/documents/adoptedtext/tal0/eresl729.htm (on the
overlap with criminal law and employment law); see also EUR. PARL. Ass. REP., The Protection of "WhistleBlowers," Doc. No. 12006 (2009), available at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=
12302&Language=EN.
36. See Lewis & Vandekerckhove, supra note 9, at 253; United Nations Development Programme, International Conference on Freedom ofAccess to Information and the Position of Whistleblowers in Serbia, UNDP.ORG.RS
(June 29, 2010), http://www.undp.org.rs/index.cfin?event=public.newsDetails&revid=B6CBCC28-DCB1-77
FC-9888FEA024D2A762.
37. 116 Stat. 745, § 1514A.
38. Krawiec, OrganizationalMisconduct, supra note 1, at 577-78.
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Attorney-client privilege can be invoked to shield corporate audits from discovery and
disclosure; these are "rules mandating that any information produced through internal
policing measures will not be used against the organization, provided that the organization
cooperates with any government investigation." 39
Internal investigations, with the principal objective of "find[ing] the facts and remedy[ing] the problems, including blunting public speculation of the degree and extent of
wrongdoing,"4 0 can be intrusive. Data protection law has a significant influence on the
action undertaken by the investigating party, which directly affects the legal position of
employees involved in internal investigations.
European data protection law requires companies to comply with several principles
while collecting, retaining, and processing information. These principles are "fair and
lawful processing," "legitimate purpose," "relevance," "accuracy," "security," and principles relating to data transfers. 4 1
The law serves to strike a balance between the effective investigation and the right of
the employee while promoting transparency. Ideally, employees should be notified before
the investigation enters the actual data collection phase. 42
During data collection, the investigator must ensure that the data processing is "legitimate" under local laws. 43 A distinction is made regarding whether the data is merely
personal data or whether it is "sensitive" personal data.44 "Sensitive" data provides strong
evidence and relates to the commission of an offense.4s This difference enhances the
legitimacy of processing such information. For example, personal data can be legitimized
by indicating the required compliance with money-laundering regulations, while "sensitive" data can be legitimate for funding a legal claim.46 If data qualifies as "sensitive," the
rules are stricter for legitimate processing. 47
Employees are also protected by the requirement of collecting personal data up to a
proportionate extent.48 The proportionality is tested by the aim of the investigation (is it
an alleged criminal offense, or does it concern an internal policy?), compared to the intrusiveness of such action (is the information highly personal, or is it publicly available?).49
Following the conclusion of an investigation, personal data may only be retained as necessary.50 This necessity depends on the nature of the information found and the extent it is
useful for legitimate purposes.5 If the material is used for a legal process, the personal
data may be retained during the process and for some time after completion. 52
39. Id. at 578.
40. BENJAMIN R. CRVILETTI, INTERNAL CORPORATE INvESTIGATIONS xix (Brad D. Brian & Barry F.

McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003).
41. For a brief indication of these principles see Cooper, supra note 30.
42. Id. at 34.
6
43. Id. at 3 .
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 38.
47. Id. at 45.
48. Id. at 15.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 55.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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European data protection rules that can influence an employee's rights include the requirement to ensure security of the retained data,53 the considerations relating to data
55
transfers to another country,5 4 and the principle of "finality." This latter principle reof the collection. 56 A
purposes
the
intended
for
used
is
only
data
collected
that
the
quires
57
company cannot change this purpose and use the personal data beyond the investigation.
Additionally, employees can request to access their data that was gathered during the
investigation.58
3.

Whistleblower Protections

Protecting the whistleblower involves specific components of employment law and
criminal law under antitrust law. International agreements, again, provide a broad framework for individual states to adapt.59
Another specific area of law that has significant consequences for the legal position of
employees is that of whistleblower protection against retaliation. Defining retaliation has
been considered impossible because "retaliation-as with wrongdoing-resides in the eye
of the beholder." 60
To indicate the importance of protection, the threat of negative consequences following
reported misconduct is the primary reason employees do not disclose alleged misconduct. 61 Consequently, when the threat of retaliation is low, employees are more likely to
blow the whistle. 62 Besides being made redundant in an organization, common consequences following the reporting of misconduct include being blacklisted, being treated as
mentally instable or even insane, losing life savings following lawsuits, and even losing a
63
marriage.
a.

United States

SOX intended to promote strong corporate accountability.6 4 Following this Act, employees of publicly traded companies, including their contractors, subcontractors, and
agents, are protected when blowing the whistle on conduct that they "reasonably believe"
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 43.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Whistle-Blowing, IPAC.CA, http://www.ipac.ca/docu
ments/WBI-WhistleBlowing.pdf (last visited May 22, 2013).
60. MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 202 (1992).
61. ERNST & YOUNG, A SURVEY INTO FRAUD RISK MITIGATION IN 13 EUROPEAN COUNTRIEs 9 (June

2007) available at http://www2.eycom.ch/publications/items/2007-fids/ey-2007IDS-europe-survey.pdf.
62. Barbara Masser & Rupert Brown, "When Would You Do It?"An Investigation into the Effects ofRetaliation,
Seriousness of Malpractice and Occupation on Willingness to Blow the Whistle, 6 J. OF COMMUNITY & APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHOL. 127, 129 (1996).

63. Annette D. Greene & Jean K Latting, Whistle-Blowing as a Form of Advocacy: Guidelinesfor the Practitioner and Organization, 49 SOcIAL WORK 219, 221(2004).
64. Susan L. Maupin, Retaliation Against Whistle-Blowing Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Understanding the
Law, 35 THE BRIEF 13, 13 (2006).
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involves several securities regulations and other fraud against shareholders. 65 Consequently, the protection extends to mistaken allegations. Both current and former employees are protected by SOX against discharge, demotion, suspension, threats, harassment,
and other discrimination with respect to employment terms, conditions, and privileges. 66
The protection extends to employees providing information and assisting in investigations
and to employees filing, testifying in, participating in or otherwise assisting in a
proceeding. 67
b. European Union
There is no European-wide legislative protection for whistleblowers against retaliation.
The necessity of legal protection of whistleblowers against retaliation is, however, stressed
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). On September 14,
2009, PACE published a report from the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
entitled "The Protection of Whistleblowers," which urges the Committee of Ministers to
take action in drawing up guidelines while taking the Resolution principles into account.68
It also calls upon Member States to review legislation on compliance parallel to the guiding principles. 69 The report notes that "[m]ost member states of the Council of Europe
have no comprehensive laws for the protection of 'whistle-blowers.'"70
In the United Kingdom, employees are protected against any detriment on grounds
that they made a "protected disclosure" about their employer or co-worker by the Public
Interest Disclosure Act of 1998 (PIDA).71 Such disclosures may be related to a wide range
of acts, including criminal offenses, legal obligations, miscarriages of justice, danger to
health and safety, and damage to the environment. 72 In a recent case, the Employment
Appeal Tribunal held that when a claimant's act falls within the scope of protected disclosures and suffered detriment, the burden of proof is on the respondent that the treatment
did not relate to the protected disclosure.73

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. David Lewis, The Council of Europe Resolution and Recommendation on the Protection of Whistleblowers, 39
INDUS. L. J. 432, 432 (2010).
69. See EUR. PARL. Ass. RESOLUTION, supra note 35, § 6.2.2. ("this legislation should protect anyone who,
in good faith, makes use of existing internal whistle-blowing channels from any form of retaliation (unfair
dismissal, harassment, or any other punitive or discriminatory treatment)") (for all guiding principles see id.
§ 6). See also EUR. PARL. Ass. REP., supra note 35; EUR. PARL. Ass. REP., Protection of "Whistle-Blowers",
Recommendation 1916, § 2 (2010), available at http://assembly.coe.inr/Main.asp?link=/Documents/Adopted
Text/tal0I/ERECl916.htm.
70. EUR. PARL. Ass. REP., supra note 35.
71. Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c. 23, §47B(1) (U.K), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1998/23/contents?view=plain.
72. Id. § 43B(1).
73. Fecitt & Others v. NIS Manchester, [2010] UKEAT 0150_10_2311 [48]; for more detail on this case,
see generally Rad Kohanzad, The Burden of Proofin Whistleblawing: Fecitt and Others v. NHS Manchester, 40
INDUs. L. J. 214 (2011).
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C. DOMESTIc LAW PERSPECTIVES
International efforts to harmonize corporate governance and antitrust practices across
borders remain subject to domestic implementation. A comparative analysis of whistleblowing laws in the United States and Europe demonstrates the interrelation of criminal
laws, employment laws, and antitrust laws with the social and cultural norms that influence compliance programs. Corporations in both areas are subject to compliance programs that use whistleblowing mechanisms, but whose application differs under domestic
laws.
SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act 74 provide the foundation for whistleblowing policies
within corporate compliance programs in the United States. SOX requires public companies to maintain a forum for addressing issues related to "questionable accounting or auditing matters." 75 It also provides reasonable protections against retaliation to individuals
that disclose information regarding these questionable practices. 76 The Dodd-Frank Act
was developed in the aftermath of the 2006-2007 financial crisis as an effort to overhaul
the financial regulatory system. Dodd-Frank incorporates new regulations regarding
whistleblowers to improve regulations in the financial sector through internal disclosure
mechanisms. It introduces financial incentives and strengthens anti-retaliatory protections to encourage individuals to address potentially illegal corporate activity.77 The
Dodd-Frank Act has significantly changed the landscape for whistleblowing in the United
States. While it caused serious concern amongst many companies based on its rewardbased incentives for using external whistleblowing mechanisms, it also increased recogni78
tion of the necessity for transparency within businesses.
Within Europe, states enforce domestic practices that are compatible with European
Union and European Council policies while abiding by social and cultural interpretations
of effective corporate governance policies. This adds an additional layer to the structure
of whistleblowing programs in Europe, holding states accountable to strong international
and regional ideas of effective whistleblowing mechanisms.
It is essential to recognize the challenges corporations face with whistleblowing policies
in implementing and investigating compliance programs in both the United States and
Europe. Although international agreements provide an adequate framework for whistleblowing, the actual application through domestic laws produces recognizable divergence.
1. General Whistleblowing Policies
In the United States, SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act provide the foundation for corporate compliance programs. SOX significantly expands the importance of internal compli74. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 31, 42, and 44 U.S.C.).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
76. See id. § 806.
77. 7 U.S.C. § 26.
78. Michael D. Greenberg & Donna C. Boehme, How Whistleblower Rule Enables Corporate Compliance,
RAND CORPORATION (une 14, 2011), http://www.rand.org/blog/2011/06/how-whistleblower-rule-enablescorporate-compliance.htnl.
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ance structure in securities law. 79 Together with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rules implementing it, SOX requires the disclosure of information relating to internal controls over financial reporting, the company's conduct and ethics codes, and
whether the company has an audit committee meeting certain criteria.80
E.U. Member States continue to enforce domestic practices that are compatible with
E.U. policies while abiding by social and cultural interpretations of effective corporate
governance policies. 8 '
In determining the effectiveness of whistleblowing provisions for criminal law, antitrust
law, and employment law in an international context, it is essential to recognize the challenges corporations face in implementing and investigating compliance programs.

2.

Company Implementation

This section addresses the manner in which companies implement whistleblower policies in the United States and in Europe. It focuses on data protection and employee
obligations to highlight the differences in the systems and their interaction with existing
criminal and employment laws.
Implementation of whistleblowing policies involves two important considerations for
corporations-employee's reporting obligations and data protection laws. Divergences
between the preferred models in the United States and within European countries, however, remain important considerations for implementation. The differences not only challenge the implementation and investigation of whistleblowing policies, but also impact the
different roles of criminal law, employment law, and antitrust law in corporate compliance
programs. 82

79. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failureof Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.
487, 502 (2003).

Q.

80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7262, 7264, 7265 (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.308, 229.406, 220.401; see generally
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§§7201-7266 and scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5,
7, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 31, 42, and 44 U.S.C.); A Guide To The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT 2002, http://www.soxlaw.com/ (last visited June 19, 2013); see generally Making Sense of DoddFrank, LEONARD STREET AND DEINARD, http://dodd-frank.com/ (last visited June 19, 2013).
81. Hunton & Williams LLP, French Appeals Court Suspends U.S. Company's Whistleblower Program, PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURIY LAW BLOG (October 13, 2011), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/

2011/10/articles/french-appeals-court-suspends-u-s-companys-whisdeblower-program/.
82. Top Ten Considerationsfor Whistleblowing Schemes in Europe, ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL
(Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/whistleblowing-scheme-in-europe.
cfm?makepdf=1; Steven A. Lauer, EU Data Privacyfor Whistleblower Hotlines: VariationAmong EU Countries'
Laws Requires Flexibility in Hotline Scope and Operations,GLOBAL COMPLIANCE SERVICES, INC. (2008), http:!!
www.globalcompliance.com/pdf/eu-data-privacy-for-whistleblower-hotlines-variation-among.pdf (last visited
July 10, 2013) (quoting at n. 20: "The number of issues raised by the implementation of whistleblowing
schemes in Europe in 2005, including data protection issues, has shown that the development of this practice
in all EU countries can face substantial difficulties. These difficulties are largely owed to cultural differences,
which themselves stem from social and/or historical reasons that can neither be denied nor ignored").
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a. Employee Obligations
Imposing a duty on employees to disclose antitrust violations straddles criminal law,
employment law, and competition law. Voluntary disclosure, however, remains an option
under some structures.
Within whistleblowing programs there are different approaches for encouraging employee disclosure. Some programs obligate employees to report or face penalties while
other programs prefer policies that encourage voluntary disclosure. A required disclosure
can subject an individual to sanctions or even criminal penalties for failing to notify the
appropriate contact of suspected or known violations.83 In addition to obligations imposed on employees through whistleblowing laws, employment laws can also provide the
basis for a duty to disclose.
Under SOX, certain employees are obligated to divulge information on anticompetitive
behavior.84 Although obligatory disclosures are subject to criticism, there are certain benefits associated with compelled whistleblowing programs-including risk allocation, social
penalty reductions, improved efficacy of voluntary programs, and speedier disclosures.85
Additionally, employees in non-managerial positions may not be required to disclose suspected illegal behavior, but incentives can encourage disclosure through reward-based
systems.86
The United Kingdom recognizes similar obligations for employees in certain sectors or
positions based on employment laws.87 The duty to report through "express terms," "implied terms," or "equity" is not typically imposed on 'ordinary' employees; this duty is
usually reserved for managerial positions.88 The British Standards Institute, however, recognizes challenges to obligatory reporting-including negative ramifications on an open
and accountable work culture, issues of fairness in the dispensation of sanctions, and potential over-reporting to avoid sanctions. 89 The Council of Europe places greater emphasis on voluntary disclosure, encouraging whistleblowing schemes that indicate that
disclosure is non-obligatory and voluntary at the discretion of the whistleblower.90
Employee obligations influence data protection and whistleblower protection protocols,
particularly with regards to voluntary notifications. An employee is more likely to voluntarily provide information on illegal corporate activity if they feel secure in both the disclosure methods and the post-disclosure protections. 91
Under SOX, certain employees are obligated to divulge information that suggests fraud
within a corporation or collusion within a market. This requirement is occasionally sup83. Banisar, supra note 12.

84. 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
85. Elizabeth Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate Governance Provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. Pot'Y J. 1, 2-3 (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=930226.
86. For instance, an individual that acts as a whistleblower for unpaid or improperly paid taxes may receive
a monetary portion of the total tax owed for their assistance in the collection.
87. See Carr & Lewis, supra note 11, at 11, 16.
88. Id. at 12.
89. BRrsH STANDARDS INsTfTTE, supra note 5.

90. Top Ten Considerationsfor Whistleblowing Schemes in Europe, supra note 82.
91. Banisar, supra note 12.
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plemented with rewards for the whistleblower. 92 In Europe, however, there is greater
emphasis on voluntary disclosures and ensuring that employees are not required to divulge
suspected illegal activity. 93
Employee obligations are an important component of whistleblower laws because of the
influence on data protection and whistleblower protection protocols. In Europe, the laws
are inclined to promote voluntary action rather than obligatory reaction because of the
stigma against anonymous reporting and data protection laws.
b. Data Protection Issues
The establishment of a whistleblower policy requires mechanisms that facilitate rather
than impede effective reporting. International agreements related to whistleblowers provide vague frameworks; effective mechanisms are, therefore, subject to national laws. Divergence in data protection requirements in the United States and Europe pose the most
significant challenge to uniformity of whistleblowing policies.
In the United States, SOX section 301(4) dictates the importance of anonymous complaints. SOX requires audit committees to establish procedures for the "confidential,
anonymous submission by employees regarding questionable accounting or auditing
matters."94
Within Europe, data protection laws tend to oppose the use of anonymous complaint
systems. Traditionally, the European Union has placed significant emphasis on the respect for individual rights, which led to E.U. Directive 95/46/EC.9s Corporations that
operate within specific data protection laws are required to balance whistleblowing programs with applicable data protection laws. 96 The Working Party published Opinion 1/
2006, addressing the application of E.U. data protection rules to internal whistleblowing
programs, finding that it was possible to construe foreign statutes and regulations as nonlegal obligations under E.U. Directive 95/46/EC. 97 The "proportionality principle"
brings the Directive and Opinion together to protect data while enabling effective whistleblowing mechanisms by limiting the type of data collected and the type of employee
with access to the reporting scheme.98 In January 2012, however, the European Union
unveiled a draft General Data Protection Regulation. 99
To facilitate the development of effective whistleblowing mechanisms in conjunction
with existing data protection laws, European nations have adopted strategies to protect
individuals and comply with international and national ideas on corporate governance. 0
92. Tippett, supra note 85, at 2-3; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: InvigoratingIncentives for
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REv. 91, 92 (2007).
93. Mathieu Bouville, Whistle-Blowing and Morality, 81 J. Bus. ETHics 579, 579 (2007); Top Ten Considerations for Whistleblowing Schemes in Europe, supra note 82.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4).
95. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 OJ. (L 281/31) 3 (EU).
96. Banks & Murphy, supra note 18, at 368-369.
97. Lauer, supra note 82.
98. Top Ten Considerationsfor Whistleblowing Schemes in Europe, supra note 82.
99. See generally Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processingof PersonalData and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
100. Harold Hassink, Meinderd de Vries & Laury Bollen, A Content Anlaysis of Whistleblowing Policies of
Leading European Countries, 75 J. Bus. ETmcs 25, 25 (2007).
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Some of these strategies include limiting the individuals that may file whistleblowing complaints, limiting the issues that can be addressed in whistleblowing complaints, and limiting the mechanisms or regulatory bodies that can receive complaints from
whistleblowers.' 0 Individual states enacted national laws designed to protect individual
data, which were upheld over implementation of certain whistleblowing mechanisms. A
2011 French court decision suspended a whistleblower program implemented by the
French affiliate of an American company because the program was not limited in terms of
employees that could report and the scope of activity that could be reported.102 Additionally, the website and the hotline werc not consistent in the implementation of personal
disclosure-the website encouraged anonymous reporting while the hotline encouraged
identified reporting.1o3 Germany's modification to its whistleblowing laws received significant attention for attempting to make whistleblowing laws compatible with data protection laws. 104
Implementation of SOX provisions for corporations established in both the United
States and Europe are the cause of significant tensions between U.S. whistleblowing requirements and European data protection requirements. 0 5 Conflict between these two
dominant perspectives indicates the challenges facing international corporations implementing effective whistleblowing mechanisms.
As explained previously, 0 6 in the United States, SOX section 301(4) dictates the importance of anonymous complaints.107 Within Europe, however, data protection laws view
anonymous hotlines differently.os Individual states have also enacted national laws designed to protect an individual's data; these laws were subsequently upheld over implementation of certain whistleblowing mechanisms. 09 The conflict between these
dominant perspectives on data protection laws indicates the challenges facing international corporations attempting to implement effective whistleblowing mechanisms.11o
The positions of the United States and European Union with regard to the interface of
employer and employee protection in compliance matters are significantly different. European countries take a strong pro-employee approach by focusing on the rights of the
accused, while the United States offers greater employer protection in the compliance
101. Lewis & Vandekerckhove, supra note 9, at 254-55.
102. Hunton & Williams LLP, supra note 81.
103. Id.
104. Hogan Lovells, Germany: ParliamentAppoints Hogan Lovells Lawyer as Erpertfor PublicHearingRegarding Whistleblowerfurisdiction and Data Protection, CHRONICLE OF DATA PROTECTION (March 7, 2012), http://
www.hldataprotection.com/2012/03/articles/international-eu-privacy/germany-parliament-appoints-hoganlovells-lawyer-as-expert-for-public-hearing-regarding-whistleblower-jurisdiction-and-data-protection/.

105. Lanois, supra note 33.
106. See supra § I.C.2.b.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
108. Opinion 1/2006, supra note 29; Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 95, at 31-50. The "proportionality principle" brings these two documents together to protect data while enabling effective whistleblowing mechanisms by limiting the type of data collected and the type of employee that has access to the
reporting scheme. See also Top Ten Considerationsfor Whistleblowing Schemes in Europe, supra note 82.
109. COURS D'APPEL [CA] [regional court of appeal] Caen, 3e ch., Sept. 23, 2011 (Fr.), available at http://
www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/article_3236.pdf;
Cf Arbeitsgericht Wuppertal,
[Wuppertal Labour Court] June 15, 2005, BV 20/05, NZA-RR 2005, at 476 (Get.).
110. Lanois, supra note 33.
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process. Ideas on the value of anonymity in reporting lead to a different valuation of the
rights of the reporting party and the accused."I
3. Company Investigations
This section addresses the next phase in whistleblower policies-after the whistleblower
has alerted the company to potentially fraudulent practices there must be an effort to
protect the whistleblower from retaliation. At this phase, the United States and Europe
provide more consistent practices. A company is required to conduct an investigation
following a fraud allegation, which requires provisions protecting whistleblowing individuals involved in the disclosure (under criminal law and employment law).
International agreements indicate the need for companies to conduct an internal investigation following allegations of anticompetitive or fraudulent activity. Companies have
frequently engaged in anti-retaliation remedies and reward-based approaches to encourage disclosure.112 Reward-based approaches alone are insufficient; to promote disclosure it is imperative that provisions exist to protect whistleblowers during and after the
investigation.
Whistleblower laws include specific provisions to protect whistleblowers from retaliation. In the United States, for example, the Occupational Safety & Health Administration
(OSHA) operates a Whistleblower Protection Program to ensure that employees in certain sectors are protected when reporting alleged violations." 3 Resolution 1729 of 2010
by the Council of Europe emphasized specific protections necessary for whistleblowers.114
The resolution stressed the necessity for comprehensive whistleblowing legislation focusing on providing a safe alternative to non-disclosure, monitoring by independent external
bodies to ensure compliance with whistleblower protection initiatives, and improving the
general corporate cultural attitude toward whistleblowing."u
Regardless of these provisions, there remain problems with protecting whistleblowers.'16 Disclosure provisions can still foster disincentives to disclose; employees may be
afraid of retaliation, social ostracism, and psychological strain related to their role in

whistleblowing.1'7
Corporate governance programs recognize the importance of protecting whistleblow-

ers, whether they are acting voluntarily or under an obligation and whether they are anonymous or identified. Protecting whistleblowers promotes honesty and transparency by
encouraging individuals to recognize and report anticompetitive behavior.Is Protecting
111. MYSAFEWORKPLACE 2006, supra note 25, at 1.
112. Tippett, supra note 85.
113. The Whistleblower Protection Program, UNrrED STATEs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.whistle
blowers.gov/ (last visited June 19, 2013).
114. EUR. PARL. Ass. RESOLURON, supra note 35.
115. Id.
116. Brian Martin, Illusions of Whistleblower Protection, 5 UTS L. REV. 119 (2003).
117. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, supra note 92.
118. Cf Hassink et. al., supra note 100; The Whistleblower Protection Program,supra note 113 (OSHA, in the
United States, offers resources to enforce statutory protections of whistleblowers); Mary Kreiner Ramirez,
Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection:A Tale of Reform Venus Power, 76 UNIv. CINc. L. REV. 183
(2007), availableat http://washburnlaw.edu/profiles/faculty/activityLfulltext/ramirez-mary-2007-76university
cincinnatilawreviewl83.pdf; Martin, supra note 116.
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whistleblowers is one of the crucial elements of an effective corporate governance policy
because it promotes honesty and transparency in corporate practices to avoid anticompetitive behavior.
D.

IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERGENCE

The different perspectives on anonymous disclosures and the additional obstacles the
new E.U. data protection regulation might providell9 challenges to identifying a duty to
disclose and to converging these differing ideas on the scope of disclosure. In this respect,
an examination into the US and European models may illustrate the potential implications
for divergence.
1. United States
In its corporate governance provisions, SOX imposes duties on several professionals.
First, attorneys have a duty to report evidence of securities fraud to the chief legal officer
of the company. 120 Second, executives must certify that the financial statements comply
with securities law.121 Third, the audit committee members of the board of directors are
22
required to take an active role in investigating and receiving whistleblowing complaints.1
Interestingly, employees have a general duty to cooperate with internal investigations,
even if this leads to disclosing personally incriminating material. The Fifth Amendment
rightl 23 against self-incrimination does not apply in this situation.124 Additionally, corporate evidence may not be withheld by employees reasoning that this falls within their right
to remain silent.125
2.

European Union

As previously explained,126 in the United Kingdom, the obligations of employees follow
from the "express terms" in the employment contract, the "implied terms" (including the
duty of good faith and fidelity), and "equity," imposing fiduciary obligations.1 27 There is
no general duty to report or investigate imposed on "ordinary" employees. But a manager
can have such a duty. In the case of Swain v. West Ltd, the general manager was obligated
to report his managing director's wrongdoing, following the duty to "provide, extend and
119. Cynthia O'Donoghue & Nick Tyler, U.S. Wades into Debate on Revision to EU Data Protection Directive,
BLOG (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.globalregulatoryenforcement
lawblog.com/2012/01/articles/data-security/us-wades-into-debate-on-revision-to-eu-data-protection-direct
ive/.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
121. Id. §§ 302, 906.
122. Id. §§ 301, 207, 407.
123. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("[nlo person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself').
124. See Lindsay K Eastman, Note Revising the OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines to Eliminate the Focus on
Compliance Programsand Cooperationin Determining Corporate Sentence Mitigation, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1620,
1642 (2010); Richard V. Wiebusch & Conor A. Gearty, InternalInvestigationsConductedin the United Kingdom:
A Human Rights Law Perspective, EUR. HUMAN RIGHTs LAw REVIEw, 20, 28 (2001).
125. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974).
126. See supra § I.C.2.a.
127. Carr & Lewis, supra note 11, at 52.
GLOBAL REGULATORY ENFORCEMENr LAW
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develop the interest of the company."28 A consequence of not abiding by the duty to
report colleagues was dismissal on the grounds of misconduct. Even if there is no express
duty established in a code of conduct or contract, the employer could base its decision on
"some other substantial reason" as a fair reason for dismissal since it suffices for employers
to genuinely believe a reason to be fair.129
In another UK case,1 30 a company allegedly collapsed because of the misappropriation
of $400 million. The judge determined that whether the executive was under a duty to
report the wrongdoing by its colleagues depended on several factors, including the terms
of his employment contract, his duties and his seniority in the company, the nature of the
wrongdoing, and the potentially adverse effect on the company.13
H. Introspecting on Setting Up Effective Compliance Programs: Aligning
the Integrated Components of Corporate Compliance
There is a lack of judicial guidance for corporations and the compliance industry to
evaluate the effectiveness of a compliance program. Nonetheless, there are certain accepted standards and elements to understand how an "effective" compliance program can
be set up, with the approach of several commentators favoring that a less detailed compliance program model set in law would be better; otherwise companies face the risk of being
constrained to adapt to a stricture which they do not essentially need. Tailored compliance programs provide the ideal method for addressing these issues.
A.

SETTING OUT THE STANDARDS FOR "EFFECTIVE" COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS:
WHAT IS AN "EFFECTIVE" COMPLIANCE PROGRAM?

U.S. law reduces or eliminates organizational liability for enterprises that demonstrate
the existence of "effective" internal compliance structures.132 The Organizational Sentencing Manual lists the minimum steps that an organization must take to qualify for
consideration of a reduced sentence, "effective" compliance structures result in a reduc34
tion of the organization's fine;133 this fine can be reduced by up to 60 percent.1
First, an effective internal compliance structure contains a written ethics code or similar
code of conduct that sets the ostensible limits of acceptable behavior within the firm.13s
Mechanisms of code enforcement-such as internal reporting and information gathering,
128. Swain v. West (Butchers) Ltd., [1936] 3 All E.R. 261 (C.A.) (Eng.).
129. Carr & Lewis, supra note 11, at 71 (citing Ely v. YKK Ltd, [1993] Ir. L. R. 500 (CA) (N. Ir.).
130. RBG Resources Plc v. Rastogi, [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2782 (Eng.).
131. David Lewis, When Do Employees have a ContractualDuty to Report Wrongdoing?, 33 IND. LAw J. 279

(2004).
132. 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2001) (stating that effective internal compliance structures are those that are
"reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that [they] generally will be effective in presenting and
detecting criminal conduct. Failure to detect the instant offense, by itself, does not mean that the program
was not effective").
133. Id. § 8C2.5(0(1) (expressing that effective internal compliance structures are those that follow
§ 8B2.1(a)(2)); id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).

134. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide an example for § 8C3.4 where the organization's fine was
offset by 60%. 18 U.S.CA § 8C3.4, Commentary.
135. Id. § 8B2.1(b).
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policies regarding the investigation of reported violations, procedures and policies for protecting whistleblowers against retaliation, and internal procedures and sanctions for conduct or ethics code violations-exist in many corporate codes.' 36
"Second, the organization must take steps to ensure that the code of conduct is communicated to employees and other agents . .. through training programs designed to familiarize personnel with the code and/or through dissemination and publication of the
code."' 37 Company newsletters, employee manuals, and organization websites are some
of the common mechanisms for dissemination.' 3 8
"Third, an effective internal compliance structure will contain monitoring and auditing
systems reasonably designed to detect prohibited conduct by employees and other
agents." 39
Fourth, "a reporting system that enables employees to report violations of the conduct
code or of laws and regulations by others within the organization without fear of reprisal"
is necessary for an internal compliance structure to be effective.-14
Fifth, high-level personnel within the organization must have oversight responsibility
for compliance with the code of conduct.141
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual lists other necessary minimum steps including
requiring the organization to use due care not to delegate authority to employees with a
propensity to engage in illegal activities. 142 Once a violation has been detected, the organization must take all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the offense and to prevent similar offenses.143 Additionally, the code of conduct must have been consistently
enforced. 40
B.

THE INCENTIVES AND THE DISINCENTIVES BEHIND THE NEED TO SET-UP AN
"EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM"

Companies may have various incentives and disincentives to implement compliance
programs into their organizational structure. Some of the incentives and disincentives
that companies face include the following:
Incentives:
*
*
*
*

Incentives
Incentives
Incentives
Incentives

for corporations to shield themselves against criminal liability.
to deter criminal activity within a corporation.
to potentially save millions of dollars.
to adopt sub-optimal programs.

136. Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating,Engenderingand Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes, 15(1)
Bus. & PROFFSSIONAL ETEcs J. 21 (1996); Richard S. Gruner, DevelopingJudicialStandardsfor Evaluating
Compliance Programs: Insightsfrom EEO Litigations, 1317 PLI/CORP. 162, 169 (2002).
137. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance, supra note 79, at 496; 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A).
138. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance, supra note 79, at 496.
139. Id. at 496; 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A).
140. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance, supra note 79, at 496; 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C).
141. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance, supra note 79, at 496; 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B).
142. 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(b)(3).
143. Id. §8B2.1(b)(7).
144. Id. §8B2.1(b)(6).
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* Incentives to invest in "low-cost, potentially ineffective internal policing measures
that fail to reduce organizational misconduct, yet nonetheless reduce organizational
liability"145 (what one commentator suggests is a cosmetic'46 approach to organizational compliance).
* Incentives for the company to self-report.
Disincentives:
* Expenses to create a compliance program make it difficult for small-sized
corporations.1 47
* Weakness of the sentence downgrade, which "forces companies to choose between
complying either with the spirit of the law or letter of the law."148 The more detailed
the design, the less effective a compliance program is to the differing industry-specific needs each company adheres to. This could lead to under-deterrence by the
corporation to implement compliance structures, which in turn may enhance liability,
a disincentive to self-police ex post and a difficult to credibly enforce internal compliance measures ex ante.149
* Information generated by compliance programs may be used against the corporation-by the government or in civil suits. 50 As such, the more effective the compliance program, the more likely the violations will become public.
Whether or not an organization implements a compliance program depends on how
individual organizations see the effectiveness of their own compliance mechanisms and
whether they ultimately want to invest in such programs at the risk of not being caught in
an organizational misconduct.
C.

CwAuCTERISTICS OF AN "EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM"

The central feature of an effective compliance program is that it must be adapted to fit
legal standards and persuade the public of the program's effectiveness. Some companies
may continue their operations without a formal compliance structure,' 5 ' while others
52
adopt four potential orientations for effective compliance programs.1
* "Compliance-based" approach
* "Values-based" approach
145. Krawiec, OrganizationalMisconduct, supra note 1, at 577.
146. See Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance, supra note 79, at 487 ("Cosmetic" compliance structures should be
understood as those structures designed to create the illusion of compliance for purposes of avoiding legal
liability, rather than for the purpose of deterring misconduct).
147. Krawiec, OrganizationalMisconduct, supra note 1, at n. 149.
148. Philip A. Wellner, Effective Compliance Programsand Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 27 CARDozo L.
REv. 497, 510 (2005).
149. Id. n. 53; see also Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. LJ. 1743, 1774 (2005).
150. Wellner, supra note 148, at 510-511; see discussion supra Section H.C.2.ii on data privacy and
protection.
151. Wellner, supra note 148, at 507-08 (quoting Frank 0. Bowman, M, Drifting Down the Dnieper with
Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place ofCompliance Programsin FederalCriminalSentencing,
29 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 671, 686 (2004)).
152. Id. at 513.
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As previously mentioned, empirical studies do not demonstrate the effectiveness of
compliance programs, so "courts and agencies lack sufficient information regarding the
effectiveness of internal compliance structures" designed primarily to avoid liability rather
than to deter misconduct.154 But a compliance program will generally be considered effective if it "promotes an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a
55
commitment to compliance with the law."'
Organizational culture, incentive and reward systems, and management commitment to
ethical conduct all shape the organizational environment, which determines whether an
internal compliance structure is effective or not.ls6

Two cursory standards for understanding what constitutes an "effective" compliance
program are the OECD standard and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Standard.
1. The OECD Standard
The OECD issued the "Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance" in 2010, which provides guidance on combating bribery and setting standards for
57
effective compliance programs.
The document notes that effective compliance programs require the following: (i) senior management personnel installed to support the compliance programs, (ii) a clear and
publicly known corporate policy prohibiting bribery, (iii) the fact that all employees understand and abide by internal controls and compliance programs, (iv) effective supervision of the program, (v) adoption of provisions on any kind of payments, (vi) accounting to
ensure accurate books and records, (vii) training for all employees and subsidiaries, (viii)
measures for observation of conformity with the provisions of the compliance program,
(ix) reporting and disciplinary proceedings if compliance fails, (x) an advice mechanism for
employees facing potential violations, and (xi) periodic reviews for evaluation purposes.Iss
2. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Standard
Regarded as the "gold standard" of compliance programs, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines do not provide much detail on the standards of an effective compliance program,
although they prescribe a multi-part test.159 Instead, they provide general guidance, not153. Id.; Linda K. Trevifio et al., ManagingEthics andLegal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts,41 CAL.
MGMT. REv. 131, 138 (1999).

154. Krawiec, OrganizationalMisconduct, rupra note 1, at 582.
155. 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(a), Application Note 3.
156. Jeff Allen & Duane Davis, Assessing Some Determinant Effects of Ethical Consulting Behavior: The Case of
Personaland ProfessionalValues, 12J. Bus. ETHIcs 449, 456 (1993) (finding that corporate culture and reward
systems-rather than mere ethics codes-impact employee behavior); Anita Jose & Mary S. Thibodeaux,
Institutionalization ofEthis: The Perspective ofManagers, 22 J. Bus. Erucs 133, 138 (1999) (finding that 98.8%
of managers surveyed ranked top management support and that 93% ranked corporate culture as more important than other factors such as conduct codes and training programs in encouraging ethical corporate
conduct).
157. See generally OECD, supra note 21.
158. Id.
159. Seegenerally 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(a).
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ing that an organization shall exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct, promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct, and commit to
compliance with the law.160 "Such compliance and ethics program shall be reasonably
designed, implemented, and enforced so that the program is generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct." 61
"The failure to prevent or detect an offense does not necessarily indicate that the program is ineffective at preventing and detecting criminal conduct." 62 The guidelines furthermore note that (i) standards and procedures must be established to prevent and detect
criminal conducts; (ii) employees in highly-ranked functions should ensure the effectiveness of the program and have responsibility for this purpose; (iii) daily operation should be
executed by specifically selected individuals, which should be periodically informed about
the standards and procedures; (iv) compliance with the program should be ensured, including monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct; (v) to have and publicize an
advice and whistleblowing system for employees and agents, which may include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or confidentiality without fear of retaliation; (vi) compliance shall be promoted and enforced through incentives and disciplinary measures; and
(vii) reasonable steps shall be taken to respond to criminal conduct.163 The commentary
notes that effectiveness may also depend on the relevant industry practice, the standard
required by government regulation, the size of the company, and similar misconducts by
the company in the past.164 Furthermore, sector-specific standards and U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) Guidance (memorandum for prosecutors and agreements of non-prose6
cution) provide additional indications of standards.1 s
3. Standards across Europe for an Effective Compliance Programs
Recently, the French Competition Authority (French Authority) provided rather extensive guidance on indications of an effective compliance program indicating two main
objectives of compliance programs: "firstly, [to] prevent the risk of committing infringements and, secondly, [to] provide the means of detecting and handling misconducts that
have not been avoided in the first place." 66 In addition to training the company's supervising personnel, a culture of compliance must be created and maintained. The value of
the compliance program depends on the combination of the preventive and corrective
components. The French Authority notes that there is no "one-size-fits-all" program and
that programs should be tailored to the characteristics of the company such as size, activity
and markets, organization, governance, and culture.167 The French guidelines mirror the
requirements of the OECD and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
160. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(1-2).
161. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).
162. Id.
163. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 8B2.1(a).
164. Id. §8B2.1, Application Note 2(A).
165. See John S. Moot, Compliance Programs, Penalty Mitigation and The FERC, 29 ENERGY L.J. 547, 561-67
(2008).
166. Arroarrt DE LA CONCURRENCE, Framework-Document of 10 February 2012 on Antitrust Compliance
Programmes 11, available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/framework-documentscompliancel0february20l2.pdf.
167. Id. 1 19.

1

VOL. 47, NO. 1

HARMONIZING SHIELD TO CORPORATE LIABILITY

121

The British Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has also published guidance on competition
law compliance. The OFT emphasizes that no specific compliance measures are obligatory; it suggests a "risk-based, four-step approach" that assists in tailoring the program to
68
the risk faced by the company and is not mandatory.1 "The key point is that businesses
mitigating and reviewing their
assessing,
should find an effective means of identifying,
competition law risks in order to create and maintain a culture of compliance with compe69
tition law that works for their organizations."1 The OFT approach is made up of the
following ideas: (i) a commitment to compliance by management is considered the core of
the program; (ii) aimed at identifying risks for the company; (iii) assessing the risk by
indicating whether it is high, medium, or low risk; (iv) facilitating risk mitigation where
policies, procedures, and training can be set up; and (v) reviewing the first three steps and
0
the company's commitment to compliance regularly."

m.

Conclusion

The multitudinous corporate compliance questions that companies face every day, including how to deter organizational misconduct and how to not fall under the radar of
courts and agencies, may increasingly lend support to cross-over considerations among
employment law, criminal law, and antitrust law matters. There are strong incentives for
establishing internal compliance structures implemented at a sub-optimal level when corporations choose to adopt compliance programs to shield themselves from corporate liability. But this is not to say that a discouraging picture of the effectiveness of compliance
programs is painted by such an approach.
Ultimately, internal company investigations into corporate misconduct can be effectively carried out by setting up an effective compliance program that neither fits into any
prescribed stricture, nor follows a "one-size-fits-all" approach. The underlying rationale
behind setting up effective compliance programs rests in fostering a culture of ethics and
legal compliance within corporations.
Compliance programs should be encouraged and not prescribed in a manner that compromises their effectiveness. Corporations should be allowed the freedom to tailor their
programs more effectively to their industries and business models and not be constricted
to any legal or judicial mechanical approaches.171 As one commentator effectively describes, "law should not ask whether the corporation adopted a relatively rigid framework
prescribed by the [agency]. It should ask whether the corporation's actions were, in general, reasonable efforts to ensure compliance with the law."172

168. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING GUIDANCE, How Your Business Can Achieve Compliance with Competition Law
1 1.13 (une 2011), available at http-//www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/ca-and-cartels/competition-awareness-com
pliance/oft1341.pdf.
169. Id. 1.14.
170. Id. 1.15.
171. Wellner, supra note 148, at 524.
172. Id.
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